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Just what is the Cooperative Society? You can have
one for coffee or for maize, or for wheat flour or
whatever can sit until next week and then be sold,
but not for cabbage or other vegetables that will
spoil tomorrow. It just can't work, or it could only
work if they had an airplane to send the produce to
Europe or America where there is a very high price.
But who will agree to allow the Society to control
this trade when the market is right there at
Mombasa?!
Look! . . . (A certain private trader) can easily fill
his lorry with just his own produce and that of few
other people, while the Society, with all its
members, can't even fill its.
Why do I sell to him? He offers me a much better
price for my strawberries, for example, so who
needs a society?! These larger private traders know
I grow such 'special' vegetables, so they come to me
and pay more to make sure I don't sell elsewhere. I
agree to this, and this builds up that seller's 'clout'
by enabling him to get and keep good marketing
contracts. Is this not a war?!
Remember that when. . . (a certain private trader)
was discovered buying potatoes from a member
with an outstanding debt to the Society he was
arrested and kept in remand for three days, and if
he hadn't been able to hire an advocate he would
have lost the case and gone to prison. All the people
here were ready to go and attack the cooperative
manager's clan then! Is that not a war?!
When private traders learn that prices are up in
Mombasa, they pay more for our produce at once,
but in the case of the Society, a committee has to
meet which takes too long. And then these present
members are ignorant; when our group was in
control, things were better. But the manager came
back from overseas and we were all removed, even
though the records showed that there had been a lot
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of corruption before. But he came with the District
Cooperative Officer 'in his pocket' - with the
support of the government, speaking in the name of
the President! - so we had no chance
Preface
The centre of a political system or market rather than
the periphery tends to command attention when issues
related to state economic intervention are considered.
In general, this makes sense, since it is at the centre
where policies are formulated and state interests are
most clearly visible: likewise, performance within an
economy's key sectors feeds back into policy making
and implementation, thereby setting the parameters of
future change. Yet such analyses, often relying heavily
on official rhetoric and other formal manifestations of
state intent, ignore the economic actors themselves,
especially their perceptions of the opportunities and
constraints engendered by the interplay of state and
market forces.
It may be useful, therefore, to present an example from
the political and economic periphery. An adequate
analysis of public intervention into production or
distribution markets must consider not just a policy's
goals and content, but also its full range of manifest
and latent consequences. These relate to the
distribution of material and symbolic resources and
hence to the creation, elimination, bolstering and
undermining of interests and groups entailed in its
implementation. This brief case study, taken from
Kenya's horticultural sector, shows how the 'failure'
of a state policy actually reflects a wider set of
irreconcilable goals, themselves an expression of the
inherent contradictions between the bureaucratic and
class interests the state represents. We are left asking
ourselves whether such a 'failure' might not more
accurately be considered a 'success'.
The Local Setting
Taita District, situated in Kenya's southeastern Coast
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Province, is in eco-demographic terms very much a
microcosm of the whole country.' While comprising a
vast 17,000 sq kms, nearly two-thirds of this area is
semi-arid, 60 per cent being National Park land. As a
result most of the district's 150,000 inhabitants are
confined to the middle and highland zones of the Voi
and Wundanyi divisions and to the Kilimanjaro run-
off region at Taveta near the Tanzanian border.
Indeed, about half of Taita's population increasing
at an annual rate of over three per cent is found
within Wundanyi's heavily congested highland zone,
and it is there that the bulk of horticultural production
is carried out. In common with other similar areas of
Kenya, these riding population densities have
encouraged a return to subsistence farming to meet
basic and immediate household needs.
In Taita, it has been within the relatively well-watered
and fertile Werugha valley that market agriculture has
persisted. It is from there that this case study is taken.
The Werugha valley comprises an area of about
3øsqkms supporting some 3,000 households. In
common with most of Taita's zone, the government's
programme of land adjudication, consolidation and
registration has been completed, so that agricultural
plots now contain individual dwelling units, in
contrast to the village clusters of agnatic lineages of an
earlier period. The distribution-range of land holdings
is also typical of the zone as a whole, with under half
an acre per head. A sample obtained by this researcher
in 1979, for example, found ill households in
Werugha possessing 121 land parcels. These ranged in
size from 0.6 to 10 acres, with a mean of 2.5 acres. The
two leading households, with totals of 10 and 12 acres
respectively, are among the biggest landowners in the
entire highland zone. Although these differences are
highly significant for the domestic units concerned
(even if many of them also hold land in the less-
favoured middle and lower zones) this constitutes a
rather modest distribution-range in national terms.
Cash-Cropping and Marketing
While at any one time over a third of all household
heads in the highland zone are engaged in off-farm
wage labour (and nearly all have done so at some point
in their lives), cash agriculture has a long history there
and continues to be important in maintaining the
economic viability of family units. In gross terms,
coffee has contributed by far the most revenue to
agricultural income in the peasant sector ever since the
prohibition against its cultivation by Africans was
The material used in this paper was obtained in the course of
fieldwork conducted in Kenya during 1978-81. lt forms part of a
DPhil thesis submitted in the Graduate Division of Politics.
University ofSussex, in 1985 entitled Leadership, Resources, and
Locality-Center Relations in Taita, A Political Sub-System of
Kenya's Coast Province: 1960-1975'.
48
lifted after World War II. For various reasons, the
1,500 coffee growing households constitute only about
15 per cent of the total number of households, even in
the highland zone to which its production is restricted.
Participation in cash horticultural production, on the
other hand, while yielding only about 60 per cent of
coffee's revenue within Wundanyi Division, is much
more widespread; nearly half of all households are
involved in it for at least some point in the year.
Because of the previous restrictions on coffee, the
colonial authorities gave relatively early backing to
produce-agriculture; this made tt posstble for the first
generation of returned labour migrants to continue to
participate in the cash economy after about 1930.
Initially, it was Asian traders based at Voi and other
lowland trading centres who provided the main link to
external markets, and encouraged the cultivation of
such 'non-perishables' as chillies and castor seeds.
World War II witnessed a dramatic increase in official
attention in Taita, as was the case elsewhere. Situated
just 100 miles (or five hours by rail) from the port city
ofMombasa, Wundanyi's highland zone was less than
a third the distance of similar crop-growing areas up-
country. To encourage both overall production and
marketing efficiency, the authorities improved feeder
roads and increased the programme of technical
assistance. Most significantly, government established
the Taita Vegetable Growers' Cooperative Society,
offering exemption from military service to those who
joined, and provided both a lorry for transport and
two marketing stalls at the main produce market at
Mom bas a.
With collection centres throughout the highland zone,
the Society flourished. This situation continued
throughout the 1950s as restrictions on Kikuyu
economic activity outside their own Central Province
north of Nairobi helped maintain a high demand for
Taita produce at the Coast. After 1957 and the lifting
of the Mau Mau Emergency, however, the Society's
fortunes took a dramatic turn for the worse. With
mounting up-country competition and deliveries
hindered by the impassable condition of important
lèeder roads during rainy seasons, it lost many of its
most lucrative supply contracts. Further, as prices
were thus drtven down - increasing the Society's
overheads - a number of leading growers in Taita,
most of whom had been able to develop their own
social and economic 'connections' while serving the
cooperative as stall clerks in Mombasa, left the
cooperative and established themselves as private
traders. The net effect of these factors was
unresolvable indebtedness and its liquidation by the
Department of Cooperatives in 1962. It was
reconstituted into a more modest body, the Ngangao
Farmers' Cooperative Society, limited in operation to
the Werugha valley.
Since independence in 1963 the Society's fortunes have
varied. On the one hand, substantial government
inputs have helped to underwrite its survival. Indeed,
as measured by total turnover, membership and unit
payments to growers, considerable success was
achieved. By 1970, supported by the earnings from
contracts with new schools, prisons and tourist lodges
in the district, Ngangao's membership reached 400,
but this state of affairs was short lived.
Taita's contribution to the total pooi of fresh produce
in Mombasa had by this time levelled off at about a
quarter. The Society's problems were mainly local in
origin. A major factor was the completion of an all-
weather (30 mile) road from Wundanyi to Voi,
together with the improvement of feeder roads to
Werugha itself. The private transport of both produce
- via the dozen or so lorries acquired by local
entrepreneurs (including several of the leading
growers) - and people - by a plethora of mini-buses
(mainly Asian and Arab-owned) from Mombasa,
brought about a steady decline in the Society's
volume. On the one hand, larger-scale growers/traders,
unencumbered by high administrative costs (including
corruption),2 were able to offer consistently higher
prices for produce. On the other hand, smaller-scale
traders (often from among the de facto landless and
including self-supporting women) likewise took
advantage of these new transport opportunities and
moved into the sector, nibbling away, through kinship
and other social ties, at the cooperative's supply-pool.3
The efforts of both categories of traders were abetted
by the increasing need for immediate cash among
households, making their cash transactions con-
siderably more attractive than the Society's end-of-
month payments. By the late 1970s, with up to 80
produce traders making the twice-weekly night
journeys by mini-bus to Mombasa, Ngangao's active
membership had slipped to just over 100; and most of
them were disposing of at least part of their
production through private sales. As a result, with the
prospect of the Society's final demise increasingly the
subject of discussion between its staff, members and
Cooperative Department Officials, the government
was directly confronted with the consequences of its
two-faced policy towards the marketing of fresh
produce from this locality.4
An independent auditor calculated that the Society's administrative
costs amounted to 47 per cent of its 1978 budget, leaving only 53 per
cent for payments to produce-supplying members. This meant, for
example, that private buyers were offering twice the Society's price
for tomatoes during much of that year.
In regional terms, such performance was by no means unique; by
1970, over halfof all cooperatives which had been registered in East
Africa were defunct.
indeed, according lo an expatriate adviser attached to the Society,
only two to five per cent of its members were taking all their produce
lo its stores by the end of the l970s; most took only some, while
others took none at all.
Policy Goals, Outcomes and the Role of the
Sate in Taita's Horticulture
While certain aspects of the state's role in this sector
have already been suggested, it needs to be considered
more explicitly here. On the one hand, the state has
supported this vegetable marketing cooperative in a
variety of ways: the allocation of financial subsidies
for its management (including expatriate personnel
and transport); the provision of loans for members in
the form of output and productivity-raising inputs
such as seeds, fertilisers and insecticides (and the
promise of even greater benefits of this nature in the
future); and the use of its administrative agents to
enforce compliance with the Society's bye-laws by
threatening members who sell elsewhere (especially
those with outstanding debts). At the same time,
however, at least part of the responsibility for the
penetration and vitality of private enterprise within
this market, and thus of the cooperative's weakness,
rests with the state itself. Most important here are the
following: the Minister of Cooperatives' refusal to
grant a produce-purchasing monopoly even within
Ngangao's main catchment area5 and conversely, the
ease with which private trading licences are issued6
and the laxity with which regulation is enforced at
Mombasa, the failure to intervene to give the Society
any marketing advantages with either private or
public agents, the minimal policing of the members'
sales and a near-total refusal to prosecute even those
members discovered making illegal sales or staff
engaging in corrupt practices.
How then should state policy and behaviour with
regard to the competing interests in this market be
evaluated? At the outset, it is necessary to be clear
about the goals of the several parties actually involved,
which can all be seen as embodying certain
contradictions. Society members, for instance, want to
maintain their access to the credits and loans the
cooperative offers and indeed, to prevent its total
collapse which would greatly enhance the purchasing
power' of a few large-scale buyers. lt is, after all, this
same concern about the concentration of economic
'clout' that accounts for much of their sales to petty
traders at the bottom of the entrepreneurial scale. Yet
these same members also seek to maximise their
income by selling to those paying the highest prices.
These several marketing alternatives - the Society,
large and small-scale traders - are thus seen by
growers as constituting a total system of countervailing
options, each of which has its own short and longer
term advantages - though it must be added that the
great increase in the number of prospective private
The Kenyan Minister for Cooperative Development is authorised to
issue such an order when he estimates that at least 60 per cent of a
given crop is handled by a society in a given area.
in 1978, for instance, 79such permits were issued by the local county
council; these cost 40/- each.
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buyers and the availability of agricultural inputs
through a nearby Kenya Farmers' Association store
has certainly made the society more expendable than it
was previously. Viewed in these terms, even the
Society's staff are subject to several contradictory
impulses: wanting to build up its membership and
volume, yet to extract maximum resources for
personal gain without actually killing it, which would
both end their access to such spoils and eliminate their
visibility in the eyes of the state as well as of the
community at large (in addition to exposing them to
criminal prosecution).
What are the state's goals in this area? These can be
summarised as follows: first, to foster the conditions
for increased horticultural production and marketing
so that the needs of rapidly growing rural and urban
populations might be met; second, to justify its
presence in the rural areas in general where its
administrative purpose is often as much one of
political control as of development; and third, to build
and consolidate regime support among the most
influential elements in rural society which - largely
through the state's own actions - usually turn out to
be the larger-scale growers and entrepreneurs.
Conclusions
The Society will soon die. Of course, the
government is fire: if you step on it, you'll get
burned. But there is no way to interfere with our
vegetable selling. Threats against the members just
drive them away. And does not the County Council
get considerable revenue from the produce-selling
licences it issues? And is not the County Council
Clerk a kinsman of. . . (one of the leading private
traders)? And does not (the latter) have a greater
volume of business than the whole Society? So for
the government to interfere would start a real
battle.
Many who have written about marketing cooperatives
in Kenya have accepted the government's formal
commitment to such forms of economic intervention
at face value and sought to identify measures which
would enhance their efficiency and growth. The case
presented above from Taita, however, reveals how the
state is itself largely responsible for the cooperative
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society's general failure by effectively putting
'interests' ahead of 'policy'.
Two basic factors determined this outcome. First,
while it can be agreed that cooperatives can assist in
institutionalising the power of the already economically
privileged, the Taita Vegetable Society, built upon a
relatively weak peasant sector base to begin with, has
failed to attract and hold those few growers/traders
who constitute that category. Second, and more
fundamentally however, the horticultural sector as a
whole within the agricultural economy and Taita's
place within it - or indeed, within the political system
itself are largely peripheral. This has meant that the
state has been unwilling to commit more than the
minimum of its own resources in order to resolve
'conflict' within it. Thus, although the contradictions
arising from this state of affairs are clearly visible, they
threaten no-one and allow for three useful ends to be
met: (j) the maintenance of an administrative presence
by the state; (ii) the continued existence of the
cooperative as an entrepreneurial training-ground for
future entrants into the private sector; and (iii) the
maximisation of horticultural output and delivery at
the lowest possible prices for the more politically
important, urban consumers.
Only by examining the actual consequences of a policy
- including the perceptions of options and
restrictions it engenders among the parties it affects
- can questions relating to state intervention in
markets, or other instances of public action or
inaction, be answered. It may of course be the case that
the longer-term effects of a given policy perhaps, in
this case, the ultimate destruction of the petty-
producing peasant class in Taita and the emergence of
a small landed and agricultural-commercial elite -
may give rise to tensions which the state is incapable of
resolving. Moreover, it is important to study the
struggles being waged on the periphery by particular
economic actors; these may reveal as much about how
the state operates as those situated much closer to its
economic and political centre.
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